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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a semi-static secure broadcast en-
cryption scheme with constant-sized private keys and ciphertexts. Our
result improves the semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme in-
troduced by Gentry and Waters. Specifically, we reduce the private key
and ciphertext size by half. By applying the generic transformation pro-
posed by Gentry and Waters, our scheme also achieves adaptive security.
Finally, we present an improved implementation idea which can reduce
the ciphertext size in the aforementioned generic transformation.
Keywords: semi-static, broadcast encryption, constant size
1 Introduction
A broadcast encryption [7] is a cryptographic primitive that allows a sender to
encrypt a message to a set of users so that only the users within that set can
decrypt it and obtain the message. In addition, the set of receivers is not fixed and
an arbitrary set of users can be chosen by the sender at the time of encryption.
Broadcast encryption is suggested as being efficient in a system having a large
number of group members, and it also has many practical applications such as
its use in secure database system, DRM (digital right management) and group
communications. In a broadcast encryption system, any subset of users can be
included in a broadcast, but decryption of the chiphertexts is only possible for
users included in the broadcast using their own private keys.
There are many desirable properties of broadcast encryption. It can be fully
collusion resistant, which means that a ciphertext cannot be decrypted even if
all users who are not included in the broadcast encryption collude. This is an es-
sential property of a secure broadcast encryption. Having stateless receivers [15]
is another desirable property. In a broadcast encryption with stateless receivers,
any set of receivers can be included in a broadcast encryption without requiring
any update of private keys.
Multi-receiver key encapsulation [22] (mKEM) is a key encapsulation scheme,
which allows multiple parties to share a secret key efficiently, and the notion
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of mKEM has been extended to multi-receiver identity-based key encapsula-
tion [1] [2] (mID-KEM) by combining it with an identity-based encryption [20].
Identity-based broadcast encryption [5, 19] is a combination of broadcast en-
cryption and identity-based encryption. Although it shares many similar con-
cepts with mID-KEM, an identity-based broadcast encryption focuses more on
a broadcast encryption as a generalization of an identity-based encryption. This
means that an identity-based encryption is a special case of an identity-based
broadcast encryption with a single receiver in the broadcast. In an identity-
based broadcast encryption, encryptions and decryptions are based on receivers’
identities, in which the recipients in a normal broadcast encryption are usu-
ally indexed sequentially from 1 to n. The most important difference between
broadcast encryption and identity-based broadcast encryption is the number of
users in the system. Identity-based broadcast encryptions are usually designed
to support exponentially many users since user identities are merely bit-strings
of arbitrary-size and hence, they are unknown during the system setup.
Adaptive security, also known as full security, of a broadcast encryption was
introduced by Gentry and Waters [9]. In this security model, an adversary can
adaptively select a target set by using public parameters and previously com-
promised private keys. Static security, as defined by [3], is a weaker version of
adaptive security of a broadcast encryption. In the static security model, an
adversary must declare the target set he/she wants to attack before observing
public parameters. A Semi-static security model [9] is half-way between a static
and an adaptive security model. Similar to the case in a static security model,
an adversary is still required to declare a potential target set prior to setting
public keys in a semi-static security model. However, the adversary can select
any target set to be challenged, provided that the target set is a subset of the
previously declared potential target set.
In this paper, we improve the semi-static secure broadcast encryption of
Gentry and Waters. As in Gentry and Waters’ scheme, our scheme offers semi-
static security and is fully collusion-resistant. In addition, receivers are stateless
receivers, and the sizes of the public key and the private key do not depend
on the total number of users. Our scheme also features very short private keys
and ciphertexts and is computationally more efficient than Gentry and Waters’
scheme. Based on the transformation technique from [9], our scheme can achieve
adaptive security while maintaining efficiency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will
review some related work. We will highlight our contributions and compare them
to existing schemes in the literature. In Section 3, we will review some definitions
and complexity assumptions that will be used throughout the paper. In Section
4, we will first describe semi-static secure broadcast encryption and subsequently
revisit the construction by Gentry and Waters. In Section 5, we will present our
construction that will improve Gentry and Waters’ scheme, together with its
security analysis. In Section 6, we will present the transformation of our scheme
to achieve adaptive security, following the transformation technique from [9].
We will also present a technique in the implementation of the scheme to remove
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the linear-sized tag required in the generic transformation. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Related works
Since the introduction of broadcast encryption as a revocation system [15], a
number of several fully collusion resistant broadcast encryption schemes have
been proposed. [6, 10, 11] A fully collusion resistant broadcast encryption scheme
which has short ciphertext was proposed by Boneh, Gentry and Waters (BGW) [3].
They introduced a broadcast encryption scheme with a constant size private key
and ciphertext in the static security model, then generalized it to achieve O(
√
n)
size ciphertext. As a compensation for generalization, they reduced the size of
the public key from O(n) to O(
√
n). A similar achievement in identity-based
broadcast encryption scheme was introduced Delerablée [5]. Delerablée’s work
offers constant size private keys and ciphertexts, and it supports exponentially
many identities in the random oracle model.
Gentry and Waters [9] considered adaptive security from a different approach.
They first introduced semi-static security, in which efficient schemes can be con-
structed. Then, they presented a generic transformation to achieve adaptive
security with only a small impact on the ciphertext size. Specifically, the result-
ing ciphertext size is doubled and a component, called a ‘tag’ is added, which
has a space complexity of O(|S|) where S is the set of receivers of a broadcast.
For a normal broadcast encryption, this tag is of |S|-bit and can be removed in
the random oracle model. In addition, they introduced two broadcast encryp-
tion schemes that satisfy semi-static security. Both of the schemes have constant
sized ciphertext. In contrast, the first scheme has O(n) private key size, while
the second scheme has a constant size private key.
A revocation system [15, 16] where only non-revoked users can decrypt ci-
phertexts is a type of broadcast encryption system and is comparable to semi-
static broadcast encryption. Indeed, the selective secure revocation system and
semi-static broadcast encryption offer similar functions when the encrypter in
the semi-static broadcast encryption only chooses the set of non-revoked users
to be included in the broadcast. However, it seems that Gentry and Waters’
technique is not applicable to transform selectively secure revocation to offer
adaptive security, as noted in [13].
Although our scheme and [9] can achieve adaptive security in broadcast en-
cryption, it is only adaptive chosen plaintext attack (CPA) secure. Recently, a
few adaptively chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure schemes were introduced,
including the schemes by Malek and Miri [14] and Ren and Gu [18], which fea-
ture constant size ciphertexts and private keys of size O(n). In addition, Phan
et al. [17] suggested a broadcast encryption scheme with constant size private
key and ciphertext under a non standard assumption.
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2.1 Our Contributions
Compared with Gentry and Waters’ semi-static broadcast encryption scheme
with constant size private key and ciphertext (denoted as GWSS throughout this
paper ), our construction offers a reduced-size private key and ciphertext. Also, in
terms of computation, the number of pairing and exponentiation computations
are reduced. While several adaptively secure broadcast encryption schemes have
been introduced recently, our semi-static secure scheme is still important because
a semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme can be transformed into an
adaptively secure broadcast encryption scheme. We compare the efficiency of
our scheme with other broadcast encryption schemes in Table 1. Our scheme
is quite competitive when we consider both efficiency and security. The only
scheme offering better efficiency is the broadcast encryption scheme that was
suggested by Phan et al. [17]. Unfortunately, this scheme is based on a non-
standard assumption.
Table 1. Comparison of efficiency and security of Broadcast Encryption schemes
Pub. Key Priv. Key Ciphertext Pairing Exponentiation Security
MM [14] O(n) O(n) O(1) 0/2 O(|S|)/O(|S|) ACCA
RG [18] O(n) O(n) O(1) 3/3 O(|S|)/O(1) ACCA
PPSS [17] O(n) O(1) O(1) 1/2 O(1)/O(1) ACCA
CDb [5] O(`) O(1) O(1) 0/2 O(|S|)/O(|S|) SCCA
BGW [3] O(n) O(1) O(1) 1/2 O(1)/O(1) SCCA
GWSS [9] O(`) O(1) O(1) 2/2 O(`)/O(`) SSCPA
GWaSS [9] O(`) O(1) O(|S|) 4/2 O(`)/O(`) ACPA
GWIBBE [9] O(
√
|S|) O(1) O(
√
|S|) O(
√
|S|)/2 O(|S|)/O(
√
|S|) ACPA
Our scheme O(`) O(1) O(1) 1/2 O(`)/O(`) SSCPA
Our schemea O(`) O(1) O(1) or O(`) 2/2 O(`)/O(`) ACPA
a
An adaptively secure scheme transformed from semi-static secure schemes
b
In the random oracle model
3 Definitions and Complexity Assumptions
3.1 Broadcast Encryption System
For simplicity, the definition of a broadcast encryption system is often replaced
by a key encapsulation system. Through a key encapsulation system, multiple
receivers participating in a broadcast share a symmetric key for further secure
communications. We introduce the definition of a semi-static broadcast encryp-
tion system, which is useful to understand our scheme, based on the definition
of an adaptively secure broadcast encryption system [9]. It consists of four algo-
rithms, setup (Setup), private key generation (KeyGen), encapsulation (Enc),
and decapsulation (Dec) as defined below.
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Setup(λ, n, `) takes as input the number of receivers (n) and the maximal size
of a broadcast recipient group ` (≤ n). It outputs a public/master secret key
pair 〈PK,MSK〉.
KeyGen(i, MSK) takes as input an index i ∈ {1, ..., n} and the secret key
MSK. It outputs a private key di.
Enc(S, PK) takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, ..., n}, a public key PK and a
message M to encrypt. If |S| ≤ `, it outputs a pair 〈Hdr,K〉 where Hdr is
called the header and K ∈ K is a message encryption key.
Dec(S, i, di, Hdr, PK) takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, ..., n} an index i ∈
{1, ..., n}, a private key di for i, a header Hdr, and the public key PK. If
|S| ≤ ` and i ∈ S, then the algorithm outputs the message encryption key
K ∈ K.
Correctness Property. For the correctness, the following property must be
satisfied.
For S = {1, ..., n} where |S| ≤ ` ≤ n, let (PK,SK1, ..., SKn) ← Setup(λ, n, `),
and 〈Hdr,K〉 ← Enc(S, PK). Then, if i ∈ S, Dec(S, i, di, Hdr, PK) = K.
It should be noted that the definition of a semi-static secure broadcast encryp-
tion system above can be easily extended to encrypt messages using the standard
key encapsulation mechanism/data encapsulation mechanism (KEM/DEM) trans-
formation [21] [4].
3.2 Bilinear Maps
Let p be a large prime number. Let G1, G2 be two groups of order p, and g be
a generator of G1. e : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear map satisfying the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity: For all, u, v ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z, e(ua, ub) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) /∈ 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v),∀u, v ∈
G1.
3.3 Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1. (The Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (DB-
DHE) Sum Problem for (S, m))[8] Fix S ⊂ Z and m ∈ Z \ (S + S). Let G
and GT be groups of order p with bilinear map e : G×G→ GT , and let g be a gen-
erator for G. Set α← Z∗p and b← {0, 1}. If b = 0, set Z ← e(g, g)α
m
;otherwise,
set Z ← GT . Output
{gα
i
: i ∈ S} and Z
The problem is to guess b. The specific BDHE Sum instance we use in our
security analysis is for m = 4d+ 4`− 1 and
S = [0, `− 2] ∪ [d+ `, 2d+ `− 1] ∪ [2d+ 2`, 2d+ 3`− 1]
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∪[3d+ 3`, 4d+ 3`] ∪ [4d+ 4`, 5d+ 4`+ 1]
where d = n+ 2`.
Also, we define AdvBDHESA,n,`(λ) as the advantage of an algorithm A to solve
the decision BDHE Sum problem as defined above.
AdvBDHESA,n,`(λ) = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2|.
4 Semi-static Secure Broadcast Encryption
4.1 Security Definition
Static secure broadcast encryption is a weaker notion of adaptively secure broad-
cast encryption. In a static secure broadcast encryption, the adversary must de-
clare the target set he/she wants to attack before Setup, and ask a challenge
against exactly the same target set in Challenge. Semi-static secure broadcast
encryption is in between static security and adaptive security. In a semi-static
secure broadcast encryption, the adversary must also let the challenger know
the target set before Setup in the same way that static secure requires, but the
adversary makes a challenge for any subsets of the target set which the adversary
has declared. We review the definition given in Gentry and Waters [9], which is
a game between the challenger and the adversary.
Both the adversary and the challenger are given as input `, i.e., the maximal
size of a set of receivers S.
Init: The adversary A first out a set S∗ ⊆ {1, ..., n} of identities that he/she
wants to attack (with |S| ≤ `), and let k = |S|.
Setup: The challenger runs Setup(λ, `) to obtain a public key PK. He/she
gives A the public key PK.
Extract: The adversary A adaptively issues queries q1, ..., qn−k, where qi is
that the challenger runs KeyGen on ith element of S∗c = {1, ..., n} − S∗
and forwards the resulting private key to the adversary.
Challenge: If Extract is over, The challenger runs Encrypt algorithm to
obtain (Hdr∗, K) = Encrypt(S̃, PK) where K ∈ K, and any S̃ ⊆ S∗. The
challenger set K0 = K, and K1 to a random value in K, then randomly
selects b← {0, 1}. The challenger returns (Hdr∗, Kb) to A.
Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game
if b = b′.
In the definition above, the indices of users were noted as ID. However, this
is only for the generalization of the definition. For a normal broadcast encryp-
tion, the values of ID are taken from the set {1, . . . , n} where n is an integer
representing the total number of users and is polynomial in the security param-
eter. Also, we define AdvBrSSA,n,`(λ) be the advantage of algorithm A in winning
the semi-static security game through at most ` users that can be included a
broadcast if the system has total n users. It should be noted that the maximum
number of extraction queries in this case is n−k in the definition above because
A cannot make private key queries for users in S∗.
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4.2 Semi-static Secure Broadcast Encryption by Gentry and Waters
[9]
Our main contribution is to improve the efficiency of the semi-static secure
broadcast encryption from [9]. However, their construction of semi-static se-
cure broadcast encryption was not separately written down because it can be
obtained by simplifying adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption.
For comparison with our algorithm, it is helpful to rewrite their semi-static se-
cure broadcast encryption scheme clearly based on their description and proof.
Let GroupGen(λ, n, `) be an algorithm that outputs suitable bilinear group
parameters 〈G,GT , e〉, where G is of order p ≥ n+ `.
Setup(n, `): Run 〈G,GT , e〉 ← GroupGen(λ, n, `). Set g1, g2
R←− G. Set α, β, γ R←−
Zp. Set ĝ1 ← gβ1 and ĝ2 ← g
β
2 . PK contains a description of 〈G,GT , e〉, the
parameters n and `, along with gγ1 , g
γ·α
1 and the set
{gα
j
1 , ĝ
αj
1 , ĝ
αk
2 : j ∈ [0, `], k ∈ [0, `− 2]}.
Generate a random key κ for a PRF Ψ : [1, n] → Zp. The private key is
SK ← (α, γ, g2, κ).
KeyGen(i, SK): set ri ← Ψκ(i) and output the private key
di ← 〈ri, hi〉, where hi ← g
γ−ri
α−i
2 .
Enc(S, PK): Let k = |S|. Parse S as {i1, ..., ik}. Set ij ← n+j for j ∈ [k+1, `].
Set P (x) =
∏`
j=1(x − ij). Set t
R←− Zp and set K ← e(g1, ĝ2)γ·α
`−1·t. Next,
set
Hdr ← 〈C1, C2, C3, C4〉 ← 〈ĝP (α)·t1 , g
γ·t
1 , g
t
1, e(g1, ĝ2)
α`−1·t〉.
Output 〈Hdr,K〉.
Dec(S, i , di, Hdr, PK): Suppose i ∈ S = {i1, ..., ik}. Define P (x) as above.
Let Pi(x) = x
`−1 − P (x)x−i . Set
K = e(C1, hi) · e(C2 · C−ri3 , ĝ
Pi(α)
2 ) · C
ri
4 .
Correctness. Note that K = K1 ·K2, where we gather the terms containing
a γ in K1, and the other terms in K2.
K1 = e(C1, g
γ
2 )
1/(α−i) · e(C2, ĝPi(α)2 ).
K2 = e(C1, g
−ri/(α−i)
2 ) · e(C3, ĝ
Pi(α)
2 )
−ri · Cri4 .
We have that
K
1/t
1 = e(g1, ĝ2)
γ(P (α)/(α−i)+Pi(α)) = e(g1, ĝ2)
γ·α`−1 .
We also have that
K
1/t
2 = e(g1, ĝ2)
−ri·P (α)/(α−i)−ri·Pi(α)+ri·α`−1
= e(g1, ĝ2)
ri·(α`−1−Pi(α)−P (α)/(α−i))
= e(g1, ĝ2)
0 = 1
as required.
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5 Our Scheme
Our scheme reduces the size of private keys by removing the randomness ri in
GW scheme. Below we give an intuition for the reason that we are able to reduce
the private key size (which in turn allows reduction in ciphertext size). Roughly
speaking, the key structure, (ri, g
γ−ri
α−i
2 ) for master key (γ, α) and generator g2,
of the GW scheme is commonly used to handle adaptive private key queries.
However, we observe that this capability is not required since the goal is to
achieve semi-static security. Based on this observation, we are able to remove
the randomness ri in the private key. Additionally, upon successful removal of
ri, we are also able to reduce the ciphertext size by half though removing the
component (C3, C4) which was used to cancel the effect of ri in the private key.
To be more specific, recall that in the security proof of GW scheme, the
problem instance given to the simulator contains various power of α in the ex-
ponents. That is, gα
j
for a set of j and a generator g. The simulator chooses a
polynomial f(x) of some suitable degree and sets γ = f(α). While the simulator
cannot compute the value γ, the public key is computable because it is at the
form of gγ = gf(α). In order to generate a private key for value i, the simulator
is required to compute a value related to g
γ−ri
α−i . This is where ri is needed in
GW’s proof: for any value i, the simulator can set ri = f(i). Since γ is f(α), this
ensures (α− i) is a factor of γ−ri because the latter is equivalent to f(α)−f(i).
Note that indeed the simulator is capable of generating private key for any i.
As discussed, our goal is to achieve semi-static security and thus the capa-
bility of handling adaptive private key queries is not necessary. Our simple key
structure can be proven as follows. Since any query i must come from the set
Ṡ = {1, . . . , n} \ S∗, the simulator in our scheme sets the polynomial f(x) to be
divisible by (x − i) for all i ∈ Ṡ. That is, f(x) =
∏
i∈Ṡ(x + i)f
′(x)1 for some
random polynomial f ′(x) that is also chosen by the simulator. The master key γ
is then set to be f(α). Since the adversary in the semi-static setting is restricted
to query private keys from the set Ṡ, the simulator can always compute the
corresponding private key since γ = f(α) is always divisible by (x + i) for all
i ∈ Ṡ. As such, we eliminate the need of randomness ri which in turns remove
the ciphertext component (C3, C4).
Our scheme has identical Setup with GWSS , which means the public key
remains the same as GWSS . However, in KeyGen, the random element ri of a
private key in GWSS was removed. As a result of the removal, Enc and Dec
become simpler. Also, the size of private keys and ciphertexts are reduced by
50% and less computation are required. The detail of the scheme is as follows.
Let GroupGen(λ, n, `) be an algorithm that outputs suitable bilinear group
parameters 〈G,GT , e〉, where G is of order p ≥ n+ `.
Setup(n, `): Run 〈G,GT , e〉 ← GroupGen(λ, n, `). Set g1, g2
R←− G. Set α, β, γ R←−
Zp. Set ĝ1 ← gβ1 and ĝ2 ← g
β
2 . PK contains a description of 〈G,GT , e〉, the
1 We use the (x + i) instead of (x − i) as the factor since it appears to be easier to
work with in our case.
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parameters n and `, along with gγ1 , g
γ·α
1 and the set
{gα
j
1 , ĝ
αj
1 , ĝ
αk
2 : j ∈ [0, `], k ∈ [0, `− 2]}.
The private key is SK ← (α, γ, g2).
KeyGen(i, SK): Output the private key
di ← g
γ
α+i
2 .
Enc (S, PK): Let k = |S|. Parse S as {i1, ..., ik}. Set ij ← n+j for j ∈ [k+1, `].
Set P (x) =
∏`
j=1(x + ij). Set t
R←− Zp and set K ← e(g1, ĝ2)γ·α
`−1·t. Next,
set
Hdr ← 〈C1, C2〉 ← 〈ĝP (α)·t1 , g
γ·t
1 〉.
Output 〈Hdr,K〉.
Dec (S, i , di, Hdr, PK): Suppose i ∈ S = {i1, ..., ik}. Define P (x) as above.
Let Pi(x) = x
`−1 − P (x)x+i . Set
K = e(C1, di) · e(C2, ĝPi(α)2 ).
Correctness. The correctness of our scheme is shown as follows.
K1/t = e(ĝ
P (α)
1 , g
γ
2 )
1/(α+i) · e(gγ1 , ĝ
Pi(α)
2 )
= e(g1, ĝ2)
γ(P (α)/(α+i)+Pi(α))
= e(g1, ĝ2)
γ·α`−1 .
2
It was modified to a semi-static construction to achieve constant size private
key and ciphertext. Thus, as a broadcast encryption in the semi-static security
model, this construction can be optimized as per our scheme.
5.1 Security Analysis
In this section, we shall prove that our scheme remains semi-static secure.
Theorem 1. Let A be a semi-static adversary against the above broadcast en-
cryption system that makes at most n−|S∗| queries. Then, there exists algorithm
B such that
AdvBrSSA,n,`(λ) ≤ AdvBDHESB,q,`(λ) + 2/p
where B runs in time t(A) +O((n+ `)2 · λ3) at most, assuming exponentiations
take time O(λ3).
Proof. Let us assume that BDHE Sum instance {gαi : i ∈ S} is given for m =
4d+ 4`− 1 and
S = [0, `− 2] ∪ [d+ `, 2d+ `− 1] ∪ [2d+ 2`, 2d+ 3`− 1]
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∪[3d+ 3`, 4d+ 3`] ∪ [4d+ 4`, 5d+ 4`+ 1]
where d = n+ 2`.
Init A selects S∗ ⊆ [1, n] and sends S∗ to B.
Setup B randomly generates a0, a1, a2
R←− Z∗p, and implicitly sets k = |S∗|.
Then, B parses S∗ as {i1, ..., ik} and sets ij ← n + j for j ∈ [k + 1, `] and
P (x) =
∏`
j=1(x + ij). Also, let f(x) =
∏
i∈[1,n]\S∗(x + i) · f ′(x), and randomly
construct f ′(x) that is a d−n+ k degree polynomial not to have common roots
with P (x). f(x) is constructed in this way because f(x) has to be divided by
(x+ i) to generate valid private keys if identity i does not belong to the target
set S∗.
Now, B sets
β ← a0 · α−d−`, γ ← f(α),
and
g1 ← ga1·α
4d+4`
, g2 ← ga2·α
d+`
, ĝ1 ← gβ1 , ĝ2 ← g
β
2 .
Then, all public keys which are gγ1 , g
γ·α
1 and
{gα
j
1 , ĝ
αj
1 , ĝ
αk
2 : j ∈ [0, `], k ∈ [0, `− 2]}
can be computed from the instance. Then, B send PK to A.
Extract If A makes a private key query against i, B computes
di ← g
γ
α+i
2
and sends di to A. Notice that fi(x) ← f(x)/(x + i) is a polynomial of degree
d− 1 for all i ∈ [1, n] \ S∗. Hence, B can calculate
g
f(α)
α+i
2 = g
a2α
d+`·fi(α)
because {gαi : i ∈ [d+ `, 2d+ `− 1]} is given in the instance.
Challenge For simplifying the notations, let g3 = g
α−d−`
1 = g
a1·α3d+3` , and
ĝ3 = g
β
3 . Then, g3 and ĝ3 are only possible to be computed from the BDHE Sum
instance
{gα
j
3 , ĝ
αk
3 : j ∈ [0, d] ∪ [d+ `, 2d+ `+ 1], k ∈ [0, `− 1] ∪ [d+ `, 2d+ `]}.
If A sends a set S̃ ⊆ S∗, B computes a polynomial t(x) of degree d + ` − 1
satisfying
t(x)f(x)|i = 0, if i ∈ [d+ 1, d+ `− 1] t(x)f(x)|d = 1.
t(x)P (x)|i = 0, if i ∈ [`, d+ `− 1].
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where f(x)|i is the coefficient of xi in function f .
t(x) exists due to Lemma 1 of [9]. B now sets the ciphertext values:
Hdr∗ ← 〈C1, C2〉 ← 〈ĝP (α)·t(α)3 , g
f(α)·t(α)
3 〉.
K ← Za0a1a2 · e(g, g)a0a1a2(f(α)·t(α)·α
3d+4`−1−α4d+4`−1).
It should be noted that if Z = e(g, g)α
4d+4`−1
, K is valid because t(x)f(x)|d = 1.
Guess Finally, A outputs a bit b′. B sends b′ to the challenger.
Almost Perfect Simulation We show that B’s simulation is almost perfect
from the point of A. Most of our analysis is identical with GW’s analysis [9].
In a semi-static security model, the maximum number of extraction queries is
limited as n− k because A only queries private keys for receivers not in S̃.
• PK is uniformly distributed since a0, a1, a2, and α are random.
• Private key is uniformly distributed if f(x) is uniformly distributed. In order
to verify the uniformity of f(x), the information leaking to A is formalized
as follows.
◦ In Init, A gets
f(−i) 6= 0 for i ∈ {S∗ ∪ [n+ 1, n+ `]}.
◦ In Setup, From the PK, A gets
f(α) = DLg1(g
γ
1 ).
◦ In Extract, to A, each private key query reveals
f(−i) = 0 for i /∈ S∗.
Since at most n−k extraction queries can be made, therefore the information
about f(x) to A can be formulated by total n+`−k+1 equations described
above even if we consider all non-zero equations. Because degree of f(x) is
n+ 2`, f(x) can be random and independent. This implies that the private
key is also appropriately distributed.
• Suppose Z is random, then the statistical difference from uniform distribu-
tion is less than 2/p. Let Z = e(g, g)δ+α
4d+4`−1
, then K = e(g, g)δa0a1a2 ·K ′
where K ′ is the correct key for Hdr∗. When δ = 0, there is only one possible
value of K. However, when δ 6= 0, there are p− 1 equally probable values of
K depending on a0a1a2 which is non-zero.
Abort There is no additional abortion which gives advantages to A except the
cases we mentioned in Almost Perfect Simulation part.
Running Time of Simulation The running time of this game is dominated
by two computations, computing g
fi(α)
2 and t(x). O(n + `) exponentiation is
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necessary to calculate g
fi(α)
2 for each private key query, and n − k private key
queries can be made at most. Also, for computing t(x), the algorithm must
calculate at least one column of a (d + `− 1) dimension Sylvester matrix. This
requires O(`(n + `)) algorithm with the current knowledge [9]. Therefore, the
running time of this simulation is at most about O((n+ `)2). 2
6 Transforming Semi-static Security to Adaptively
Security
The adaptive security model [9] is the strongest and most realistic notion in
broadcast encryption. An adversary is not required to declare any target set
before observing public keys. As such, there is no Init phase. Moreover, the set
for a challenge cipertext can be any subsets of the set of identities that has never
been queried in the Extract phase.
6.1 Transforming Semi-static Security to Adaptive Security
In addition to the semi-static security model, Gentry and Waters also showed
how to transform a semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme to an adap-
tively secure broadcast algorithm based on the two key technique [12]. In their
technique, two keys are assigned for each user, but only one private key is allo-
cated randomly to an individual user to respond extraction queries adaptively.
Since the sender does not know which key each receiver has, the ciphertext must
be constructed for both keys. Furthermore, users can also figure out which ci-
phertext can be decrypted by their private keys through a bit included in their
private key.
We basically follow GW’s approaches to make our semi-static secure broad-
cast encryption scheme be adaptively secure. In addition to their technique, we
suggest an implementation technique to remove a linearly increasing element in
GW’s transformation. Let S be the set of receivers. The original transformation
requires that for all i ∈ S, a bit bi ∈ {0, 1} is also included in the ciphertext. In
other words, the ciphertext contains an additional component of |S|-bit.
Let S = {ID1, . . . , ID|S|} be the set of receivers. The original transformation
requires an additional one bit information for each identity IDi, denoted as bIDi ,
to be transmitted along the ciphertext. In order to transmit this information,
the transformation includes an additional bit-string t of length |S| such that
t[i] = bIDi , where t[i] represents the i-th bit of t.
In the transformation, the i-th receiver IDi ∈ S is associated with a bit t[i].
And therefore, the |S|-bit t is required.
Since decryption requires the knowledge of S, it is possible that in some
scenarios, S has to be transmitted along the ciphertext. In this case, we describe
an implementation trick that reduces the component t from |S| bits to one bit.
As the set S is normally not counted as part of the ciphertext, truly constant
size ciphertext can be achieved.
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Our Implementation Technique
Based on the observation that transmitting a set S and a sequence S̃, such that
for any i ∈ S̃, i ∈ S, requires the same space complexity, we are able to replace
{bi} with one single bit as follows. Denote is as the smallest value in S. Let
Sb0 = {i ∈ S \ {is}|bi = 0} and Sb1 = {i ∈ S \ {is}|bi = 1}. In other words, Sb0
and Sb1 are the partition of S \ {is} based on the bit bi.
We can construct a sequence
(
Sseparated
)
as seq(Sb0), is, seq(Sb1) where seq(S)
represents the random arrangement of elements of a set S to form a sequence
(for simplicity, it can be in the normal ascending order). The sequence Sseparated,
together with a bit bis would be sufficient to recover bi for all i. For instance, the
receiver first recovers the smallest identity is from the sequence Sseparated. For
any i in the sequence Sseparated, bi = 0 if i is before is and bi = 1 otherwise. The
only bit that needs to be transmitted along with the ciphertext is therefore bis .
Note that the cost of transmitting the sequence Sseparated is identical to that of
S. We do not claim significant reduction in transmission cost in practice despite
the saving in asymptotic complexity is from O(|S|) to O(1). In practice, if the set
of receivers is to be transmitted together with the ciphertext, which is possibly
true in some cases when S is highly dynamic, the actual saving of our tricks is
dlog(|S|)e − 1 bits only. However, if the set S is known to the set of receivers,
the trick is not applicable as in those cases, S does not need to be transmitted
repeatedly.
Our construction using Sseparated is as follows. Note that the size of Sseparated
is identical that of S.
Setup(n, `): Run 〈PK ′, SK ′〉 ← SetupSS(2n, `). Set s← {0, 1}n, Set PK ←
PK ′ and SK ← (SK ′, s). Output 〈PK,SK〉.
KeyGen(i, SK): Run d′i ← KeyGenSS(i + n · si, SK ′). Set di ← 〈d′i, si〉.
Output di.
Enc(S, PK): Generate a random set of |S| bits: t ← {ti ← {0, 1} : i ∈ S}.
Generate K ← K. Set
St0 ← {i if ti = 0 : i ∈ S}, St1 ← {i if ti = 1 : i ∈ S}
S0 ← St0 ∪ {i+ n : i ∈ St1}, 〈Hdr0, k0〉 ← EncSS(S0, PK ′)
S1 ← {i+ n : i ∈ St0} ∪ St1 , 〈Hdr1, k1〉 ← EncSS(S1, PK ′).
Set C0 ← SymEnc(k0,K), C1 ← SymEnc(k1,K),Hdr ← 〈Hdr0, C0, Hdr1, C1, bis〉
where bis is the bit for the smallest identity in is ∈ S. Output 〈Hdr,K〉. Also,
replace S with the sequence Sseparated ← {seq(Sb0), is, seq(Sb1)} where
Sb0 ← St0 \ {is}, Sb1 ← St1 \ {is}.
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Dec(Sseparated, i, di, Hdr, PK): Parse di as 〈d′i, si〉 and Hdr as 〈Hdr0, C0,
Hdr1, C1, bis〉. Set S0 and S1. Run
ksi⊕ti ← DecSS(Ssi⊕ti , i, d′i, Hdrsi⊕ti , PK ′).
Run K ← SymDec(ksi⊕ti , Csi⊕ti). Output K.
Since we just compress t to S through Sseperated, the security analysis remains
the same as in the original Gentry and Waters’ proof. Our adaptive broadcast
encryption, following this generic transformation, compares favourably to the
transformation of GWSS since the impact of the transformation on efficiency is
linear.
7 Conclusion
Gentry and Waters [9] introduced the security model and constructions for semi-
static broadcast encryption, which can be transformed to an adaptively secure
broadcast encryption. Based on their contributions, we introduced a more ef-
ficient semi-static broadcast encryption scheme. Our scheme enjoys smaller ci-
phertexts, shorter private keys and is more efficient in terms of computation
cost.
We also showed that an adaptively secure broadcast encryption scheme trans-
formed from our semi-static broadcast encryption scheme is still competitive
against other adaptively secure broadcast encryption schemes that have been
introduced recently. In addition, we elaborated an implementation technique to
add to Gentry and Waters’ transformation technique, which removes the linearly
increasing part in the ciphertext. By adopting this idea, the resulting adaptively
secure broadcast encryption scheme has a constant ciphertext if the underlying
semi-static secure broadcast encryption scheme has a constant size ciphertext.
Furthermore, our scheme can be used as an identity-based broadcast en-
cryption, but limited for polynomially many users. Extending our scheme for
exponentially many users might be possible following the approach introduced
by Delerablée [5] , but it will rely on a random oracle.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous referees of Pairing 2013 for their con-
structive feedback to improve our paper. Additionally, we would like to thank
Madeleine Cincotta for her thorough check to improve the linguistic quality of
our paper. Finally, we would like to thank Dario Fiore who helped us to improve
the quality of our paper. The second author is supported by ARC Future Fel-
lowship FT0991397 and partly supported by the Natural Science Foundation of
China through project 61370190.
Efficient Semi-static Secure Broadcast Encryption Scheme 15
References
1. J. Baek, R. Safavi-Naini, and W. Susilo. Efficient multi-receiver identity-based
encryption and its application to broadcast encryption. In S. Vaudenay, editor,
Public Key Cryptography, volume 3386 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
380–397. Springer, 2005.
2. M. Barbosa and P. Farshim. Efficient identity-based key encapsulation to multiple
parties. In N. P. Smart, editor, IMA Int. Conf., volume 3796 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 428–441. Springer, 2005.
3. D. Boneh, C. Gentry, and B. Waters. Collusion resistant broadcast encryption
with short ciphertexts and private keys. In V. Shoup, editor, CRYPTO, volume
3621 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 258–275. Springer, 2005.
4. R. Cramer and V. Shoup. Design and analysis of practical public-key encryp-
tion schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. SIAM Journal on
Computing, 33(1):167–226, 2003.
5. C. Delerablée. Identity-based broadcast encryption with constant size ciphertexts
and private keys. In K. Kurosawa, editor, ASIACRYPT, volume 4833 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 200–215. Springer, 2007.
6. Y. Dodis and N. Fazio. Public key broadcast encryption for stateless receivers.
In J. Feigenbaum, editor, Digital Rights Management Workshop, volume 2696 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 61–80. Springer, 2002.
7. A. Fiat and M. Naor. Broadcast encryption. In D. R. Stinson, editor, CRYPTO,
volume 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 480–491. Springer, 1993.
8. C. Gentry and S. Halevi. Hierarchical identity based encryption with polynomi-
ally many levels. In O. Reingold, editor, TCC, volume 5444 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 437–456. Springer, 2009.
9. C. Gentry and B. Waters. Adaptive security in broadcast encryption systems (with
short ciphertexts). In A. Joux, editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 5479 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 171–188. Springer, 2009.
10. M. T. Goodrich, J. Z. Sun, and R. Tamassia. Efficient tree-based revocation in
groups of low-state devices. In M. K. Franklin, editor, CRYPTO, volume 3152 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 511–527. Springer, 2004.
11. D. Halevy and A. Shamir. v. In M. Yung, editor, CRYPTO, volume 2442 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 47–60. Springer, 2002.
12. J. Katz and N. Wang. Efficiency improvements for signature schemes with tight se-
curity reductions. In S. Jajodia, V. Atluri, and T. Jaeger, editors, ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, pages 155–164. ACM, 2003.
13. A. B. Lewko, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Revocation systems with very small pri-
vate keys. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 273–285. IEEE
Computer Society, 2010.
14. B. Malek and A. Miri. Adaptively secure broadcast encryption with short cipher-
texts. I. J. Network Security, 14(2):71–79, 2012.
15. D. Naor, M. Naor, and J. Lotspiech. Revocation and tracing schemes for stateless
receivers. In J. Kilian, editor, CRYPTO, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 41–62. Springer, 2001.
16. M. Naor and B. Pinkas. Efficient trace and revoke schemes. In Y. Frankel, editor,
Financial Cryptography, volume 1962 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
1–20. Springer, 2000.
17. D. H. Phan, D. Pointcheval, S. F. Shahandashti, and M. Strefler. Adaptive CCA
broadcast encryption with constant-size secret keys and ciphertexts. In W. Susilo,
16 J. Kim, W. Susilo, M. H. Au and J. Seberry
Y. Mu, and J. Seberry, editors, ACISP, volume 7372 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 308–321. Springer, 2012.
18. Y. Ren and D. Gu. Fully CCA2 secure identity based broadcast encryption without
random oracles. Inf. Process. Lett., 109(11):527–533, 2009.
19. R. Sakai and J. Furukawa. Identity-based broadcast encryption. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2007:217, 2007.
20. A. Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In G. R. Blak-
ley and D. Chaum, editors, CRYPTO, volume 196 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 47–53. Springer, 1984.
21. V. Shoup. A proposal for an iso standard for public key encryption. IACR Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive, 2001:112, 2001.
22. N. P. Smart. Efficient key encapsulation to multiple parties. In C. Blundo and
S. Cimato, editors, SCN, volume 3352 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
208–219. Springer, 2004.
